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Should the NCAA Have to Pay?  
Long-Term Injuries in College Athletics, 
Improper Assumptions of Risk, and 
Coverage of Medical Expenses  
After College 
Alexandrea Jacinto* 
Student-athletes spend years training, perfecting their sport, and 
working hard in school in order to make it to the big leagues: Divi-
sion I College Athletics. However, when student-athletes finally get 
there, they are met with empty promises, and often leave with inju-
ries that no one took the time to warn them about. That is  
because, despite being told that they must sign an agreement with 
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) which binds 
them to the organization’s rules, athletes learn quickly that the other 
side of that agreement is rarely, if ever, upheld when they need it. 
Courts fail to recognize the coercive nature of the relationship  
between the NCAA and student-athletes, and completely ignore the 
duty of the NCAA to adequately inform athletes of the potential risk 
of their athletic participation. The long-relied-upon assumption-of-
risk doctrine utilized by the NCAA as a defense should no longer be 
accepted by the courts, as it is clear that the nature of participation 
in athletics is not always entirely voluntary. Thus, the NCAA should 
be held liable for the lifelong medical expenses of student-athletes 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2021; B.A. Government and 
Law, Lafayette College, 2016. I would like to thank Professor Jed Shugerman for his help 
and guidance throughout the creation of this Note, as well as the IPLJ staff, especially Elliot 
Fink, for helping me with every single meeting and question, no matter how many times 
they came up. I also want to thank my parents, Joseph and Denise Jacinto, my siblings, 
Max, Daniella, and Leo, my grandparents, Jose and Delminda Jacinto, and Barbara Frunzi, 
and the love of my life, Taylor Bonforte. Thank you all for supporting me, loving me 
unconditionally, and being the best cheer squad a person can ask for. 
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brought about by injuries sustained while acting as athletic repre-
sentatives of their school. 
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Performing in each football game for the University of South 
Carolina, Stanley Doughty was a promising young athlete and a 
strong defensive tackle.1 He endured multiple significant collisions 
during games, many of which resulted in injury. Without fail, after 
each hit or injury, he was quickly sent back into the game to perform 
for his team, his coach, and his school.2 Doughty relentlessly pur-
sued his dream of being drafted into the NFL. Like many other col-
legiate football players, he hoped that his athletic gift would lead 
him to success despite a perceived lack of skill in the classroom or 
familial support. 
Doughty’s dream, however, was cut short almost as quickly as 
it came to fruition. When he was asked to come to practice for the 
Kansas City Chiefs in 2007, the team and the NFL mandated that 
Doughty get a physical done through the organization’s medical 
professionals.3 Doughty’s examination revealed that he had a severe 
cervical spine injury—so severe, in fact, that one more hit could 
have left him completely paralyzed for life.4 Despite playing on  
behalf of a Southeastern Conference (“SEC”) football program 
(which is the richest and most prestigious in the country), Doughty’s 
injury had gone undetected by coaches, the university he trusted, the 
medical staff who examined him, and, most notably, by the  
NCAA.5 With this news, the young man was left with nothing—
nothing except a potentially life-altering injury.6 He now had no 
chance of a career in athletics, he had not obtained a degree from the 
 
1 See Megan Walsh, ‘I Trusted ‘Em’: When NCAA Schools Abandon Their Injured 
Athletes, ATLANTIC (May 1, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/
2013/05/i-trusted-em-when-ncaa-schools-abandon-their-injured-athletes/275407/ 
[https://perma.cc/A93H-WYSW] (Stanley Doughty was a starting player for the team so 
he played in most competitions). 
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University, and had no insurance or means to take care of himself.7 
Perhaps most brutally, despite years of dedication to his team, his 
university, and the NCAA, Doughty was left to foot the bill himself.8 
Upon reflecting on his situation, Doughty expressed his sense of  
betrayal by his university: “I was young. . . . I thought they knew 
what was good for me. I just listened to ‘em. I trusted ‘em.”9 
Student-athletes are not typical college students and should 
therefore be treated with a special duty of care by universities, and 
especially by the NCAA. This includes the ways in which they are 
treated by university training and medical staff, and then reimbursed 
for medical bills when they endure serious injuries during athletic 
participation. Students often contend with lifelong consequences 
stemming from injuries sustained while acting as athletic represent-
atives for their universities; representation from which these univer-
sities and the NCAA profit significantly. Importantly, the NCAA 
and its constituent universities are “non-profit” organizations which 
consistently make steady annual profits from the  performance and 
success of student-athletes.10 For instance, the NCAA brings in 
about $1 billion in revenue annually from the regulation of college 
athletics.11 In light of these astronomical figures, observers might 
expect that the NCAA would adequately compensate student- 
athletes for injuries sustained while making this money for  
the organization. 
This Note will focus on the relationship between student-athletes 
and the NCAA as well as the relationship between student-athletes 
and their schools. From the moment that a student-athlete joins a 
team (whether by scholarship or not) and accedes to the NCAA’s 
 
7 See id. Doughty did not actually obtain his degree; he left school early, twelve credits 
shy of obtaining his degree, in order to participate in the NFL draft. This is a common 
practice allowed by NCAA-accredited schools and the NFL. See id. 
8 See id. 
9 Id. 
10 See Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Reports Revenues of More Than $1 Billion in 2017, USA 
TODAY (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2018/03/07/ncaa-
reports-revenues-more-than-1-billion-2017/402486002/ [/https://perma.cc/R6LZ-V75U]. 
11 See Steve Cameron, The NCAA Brings in $1 Billion a Year–Here’s Why It Refuses to 
Pay Its College Athletes, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/
ncaa-college-athletes-march-madness-basketball-football-sports-not-paid-2019-3 
[https://perma.cc/QER5-HU82]. 
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rules and regulations, this special relationship between student- 
athletes and athletic institutions indicates that student-athletes  
deserve a special duty of protection from injuries and their attendant 
long-term effects.12 When this duty is not met, student-athletes 
should receive adequate legal protection, compensation, and medi-
cal coverage for their injuries. In light of college athletes’ actual ex-
periences, the NCAA’s continuous use of the assumption-of-risk  
affirmative defense should no longer be accepted by courts. Without 
such a doctrinal shift, the NCAA will continue to use this affirmative 
defense to shift the blame onto student-athletes, who are clearly not 
as well-suited as the NCAA to understand the inherent risks of their 
athletic participation. Thus, for such a profitable organization as 
NCAA, the compensation of athletes with lifelong injuries and side 
effects that will impact their lives far after the NCAA is done prof-
iting off of their athletic gifts should be a top priority. Whether this 
intervention comes from a change in jurisprudence or voluntary  
action by the NCAA and its constituent conferences is something 
that remains to be seen, although this Note argues that the NCAA 
should voluntarily take such action. 
Part I of this Note will cover the history and background of the 
NCAA, as well as the types of injuries that student-athletes endure 
while competing in collegiate athletics. Part I further elaborates on 
the categories of injuries from which student-athletes lack protection 
and the long-term implications of such injuries. Part II of this Note 
will look at assumption of risk: the tort doctrine directly applicable 
to many cases involving injuries to student-athletes and these stu-
dents’ relationships with the NCAA and their schools. Analyzing 
the on-the-ground dynamics between athletes and athletic institu-
tions and colleges, Part II will also apply the assumption-of-risk 
doctrine to the specific context of Division I college athletics. Fi-
nally, this Part will demonstrate the ways in which the NCAA uses 
the assumption-of-risk doctrine to evade liability, as the organiza-
tion argues that any contract that may exist is not enforceable.13 
 
12 See generally Keya Denner, Comment, Taking One for the Team: The Role of 
Assumption of the Risk in Sports in Torts Cases, 14 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 209 
(2004). 
13 See infra Part II.D. 
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Part III advocates for more responsibility to be taken on the part 
of the NCAA when it comes to liability for long-life medical ex-
penses accrued by injury-riddled student-athletes. In particular, this 
Part argues for a shift in the analysis of the relationship between 
student-athletes and athletic-academic institutions which would im-
pose a greater degree of responsibility upon the institutions to pro-
tect its athletes. Legally, this includes curbing the NCAA and its 
member universities’ ability to assert assumption of risk, which they 
often argue in defense of liability for athlete’s injuries. Part III will 
further argue that with this higher level of responsibility, student-
athletes should receive more adequate compensation, or, at a mini-
mum, reimbursement for accumulated bills by the NCAA; such 
compensation would cover the effects of lifelong injuries endured 
while competing in athletic competition, including, but not limited 
to, lifetime insurance plans for student-athletes, which would be 
guaranteed upon agreement to participate in collegiate athletics. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Creation of the NCAA 
The formation of the NCAA opened the door to the concept that 
student-athletes were owed certain rights and protections in  
exchange for their participation in college athletics. In 1904, after a 
growing nationwide concern over the excessive number of head  
injuries sustained by students participating in college football, Pres-
ident Theodore Roosevelt established the Intercollegiate Athletic 
Association (“IAA”), whose role was to create rules and regulations 
that would protect college athletes from injury or death in collegiate 
athletics, especially in football.14 Six years later, in 1910, the NCAA 
was born out of the IAA as an effort to further protect college foot-
ball players from the dangers of serious head injuries which were 
plaguing college athletics.15 The original objective of the organiza-
tion was to create standards and regulations that would facilitate  
a safer playing environment for college football players. The 
 
14 See Rodney K. Smith, Head Injuries, Student Welfare, and Saving College Football: 
A Game Plan for the NCAA, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 267, 268–69 (2014). 
15 See id. 
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organization, however, has significantly evolved from its basic pur-
pose. For example, the NCAA has since created eligibility and  
recruiting guidelines, rules regarding distribution of financial aid, 
and rules that student-athletes must adhere to in order to maintain 
eligibility.16 The NCAA has specific protocols for handling viola-
tions of these rules and guidelines, focusing especially on violations 
of recruitment rules, unfair competition practices, or improper fi-
nancial gains on the part of member institutions or student-ath-
letes.17 Losing sight of its initial purpose, what began as a committee 
of individuals dedicated to protecting college football players from 
horrific head injuries has ironically evolved into an economic engine 
which faces constant litigation and backlash for its perpetual inabil-
ity to adequately protect student-athletes in college, especially from 
head injuries.18 In light of this history, the NCAA’s current legal 
stance—by which it shields itself of liability for such injuries—be-
trays its founding purpose.19 
Since evolving into what is now the supervisory body of nearly 
all Division I athletics, the NCAA has created a standard of practices 
and regulations to which all student-athletes must adhere if they 
want to remain eligible athletes at participating universities (“mem-
ber institutions”).20 The organization oversees about 490,000 colle-
giate athletes among 19,500 teams at member institutions21 with the 
objectives of ensuring fairness in athletics and enforcing safety  
protocols.22 Clocking in at 440 pages, the most recent version of the 
NCAA Division I Bylaws (“Bylaws”) outlines all of the expecta-
tions of the NCAA, member institutions, and student-athletes at 
 
16 See Christian Dennie, The Benefits of Arbitration: Arbitration in NCAA Student-
Athlete Participation and Infractions Matters Provides for Fundamental Fairness, 46 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 135, 137–38 (2015). 
17 See id. at 141–42. 
18 See id. at 138. 
19 See, e.g., Rose v. NCAA, 346 F. Supp. 3d 1212 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2018); Bradley v. 
NCAA, 249 F. Supp. 3d 149, 157 (D.D.C. 2017). 
20 See generally NCAA Division I Manual (2018–19), NCAA (Aug. 1, 2018), 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D119.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BDD-
RDQJ]. 
21 NCAA Recruiting Facts, NCAA (last updated Mar. 2018), https://www.ncaa.org/sites/
default/files/Recruiting%20Fact%20Sheet%20WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/793R-5BJQ]. 
22 See Katherine Mason, Note, Informed Consent in the NCAA: A Solution to the Injured 
Athlete Epidemic, 36 WHITTIER L. REV. 511, 511–12 (2015). 
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member institutions.23 Student-athletes are expected to have fully 
read and completely understood the entirety of the 440-page docu-
ment before signing an agreement with the NCAA and their member 
institution.24 Student-athletes are also expected to comply with all 
aspects outlined in the elaborate agreement; they are otherwise  
subjected to punishment through “enforcement” by the NCAA or 
their school.25 
Instances of enforcement often revolve around economically 
charged “rule-breakings” based on the regulations laid out in the  
Bylaws.26 This includes improper recruiting practices by universi-
ties and coaches, improper compensation for student-athletes for 
their athletic participation, and other violations stemming from  
financial gain by either athletes or universities.27 More often than 
not, however, such enforcement is brought against the athletes:  
enforcement of the terms of the Bylaws against the NCAA itself—
for failing to fulfill its stated promises—is rare, despite the  
clear obligations and objectives that the association promises to  
enforce.28 Regardless of the Bylaws’ initial promise to “enhance the 
well-being of student-athletes,” the NCAA then quickly passes on 
this responsibility to its member institutions, making them carry out 
the promises set forth in the Bylaws on NCAA’s behalf.29 This prob-
lematic delegation of discretion to member institutions, born out of 
the NCAA’s evasion of legal liability, is perhaps the biggest reason 
 
23 See generally NCAA Division I Manual (2018–19), supra note 20. 
24 See Student-Athlete Statement—NCAA Division I (2012–2013) (on file with author). 
25 See id. 
26 See NCAA Division I Manual (2018–19), supra note 20. 
27 See, e.g., Craig Lyons, MSU Investigating NCAA Violation Claims Against 
D’Antonio, LANSING ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.lansingstatejournal.com/story/
news/2020/02/18/michigan-state-university-ncaa-violation-investigation-mark-dantonio-
curtis-blackwell-lawsuit/4797929002/ [https://perma.cc/R4VA-5ELV]; Aaron Beard, 
NCAA Filing Holds Firm on Charges in NC State Case, AP NEWS (Feb. 10, 2020), 
https://apnews.com/909c6543ffc1458e1dae434fe35073f5 [https://perma.cc/8G2A-
HN9W]; Pitt Panthers Men’s Basketball and Football Teams Commit NCAA Coaching 
Violations, CBS PITT. (Feb. 20, 2020), https://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2020/02/20/pitt-
ncaa-violations/ [https://perma.cc/VJ96-BBUZ]. 
28 Cf. Rose v. NCAA, 346 F. Supp. 3d 1212, 1217 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2018); Bradley v. 
NCAA, 249 F. Supp. 3d 149, 156 (D.D.C. 2017) (showing how in the rare instances when 
litigants bring a case against the NCAA, courts often throw out arguments made by 
athletes, ruling in favor of the NCAA). 
29 NCAA Division I Manual (2018–19), supra note 20, at xii. 
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that the NCAA has ultimately failed both in its mission to enforce 
its safety protocols and to adequately protect student-athletes from 
the consequences of lifelong injuries. 
B. The NCAA Bylaws and Regulations 
The NCAA describes itself on its  website as a “membership  
organization dedicated to safeguarding the well-being of student-
athletes and equipping them with the skills to succeed on the playing 
field . . . the classroom, and throughout life.”30 In the Bylaws, the 
association makes a promise to “(1) conduct intercollegiate athletics 
in a manner designed to protect and enhance the physical and edu-
cational well-being of students athletes; and (2) to require that each 
member institution protect the health of, and provide a safe environ-
ment for, each of its participating student-athletes.”31 
For the purposes of this Note, the most relevant sections of the 
2018–2019 Division I NCAA Manual fall within Article 16.4 of the 
Bylaws.32 The section titled “Medical Expenses” states that member 
institutions must provide medical care for student-athletes with  
respect to athletically related injuries that occur while participating 
in intercollegiate activities.33 However, the provision within Article 
16 also states that it is at the discretion of the member institution to 
determine how much medical care is provided, the type or level of 
care that must be provided; the provision further grants member  
institutions the power to decide whether or not the injury is “athlet-
ically related.”34 The “Medical Expenses” section details just a frac-
tion of the excessive discretion that the NCAA delegates to member 
institutions when it comes to fulfilling its promise to protect the 
well-being of student-athletes in schools, as is clearly stated in the 
NCAA’s objectives.35 Further, in the Bylaws under 16.4.1, the 
NCAA states that the coverage for student-athletes extends for a  
period of two years after graduation or departure from their 
 
30 Mason, supra note 22, at 512. 
31 Rose, 346 F. Supp. 3d at 1227. 
32 See NCAA Division I Manual (2018–19), supra note 20, at 230. 
33 Id.  
34 Id. 
35 Id.  
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respective member institution.36 Thus, the reality for student-ath-
letes is that the insurance provided by their school only covers the 
short-term and immediate impact of athletically related injuries and 
leaves them to cover their own expenses beyond those two years.37 
Despite the initial purpose for which the organization was  
established, the NCAA has been notoriously unhurried in their  
objective of creating rules and regulations for member institutions 
with regard to the medical treatment of student-athletes.38 Perhaps 
the most egregious and infamously discussed action (or inaction) of 
the NCAA has been its delay in addressing concussion protocols.39 
The NCAA did not create any kind of concussion management pro-
tocol system until 2010, even though the organization had a century 
to accomplish its main purpose: creating regulations to limit the 
number and severity of head injuries in college football.40 Further, 
although the NCAA has created such guidelines and regulations for 
member institutions, as of this writing, the NCAA has neither cre-
ated a mandate nor an enforcement strategy to ensure that NCAA-
compliant institutions specifically adhere to the lax regulations.41 In 
the apparent absence of voluntary solutions by the NCAA, this  
naked abandonment of its original purpose in favor of profit is one 
central reason that courts’ treatment of the NCAA must change. 
The Bylaws make it clear that the “regulations” and standards 
set by the NCAA were not constructed to be strictly enforced and 
that it is at the discretion of the member institution to ensure that 
these regulations are being followed.42 Such regulations include the  
enforcement of concussion protocols and general injury prevention, 
 
36 Id. 
37 See id.  
38 See Ralph D. Russo, Wave of Concussion Lawsuits to Test NCAA’s Liability,  
AP NEWS (Feb. 7, 2019), https://apnews.com/4a4ed68e4c3a426abc4e34606ae4a399 
[https://perma.cc/EZZ7-JJHQ]. 
39 See Judge OK’s Concussion Suit Settlement vs. NCAA, ESPN (Aug. 12, 2019), 
https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/27376128/judge-oks-concussion-suit-
settlement-vs-ncaa [https://perma.cc/CEP3-CWKP]; see also id. 
40 See Elizabeth Etherton, Systematic Negligence: The NCAA Concussion Management 
Plan and Its Limitations, 21 SPORTS L.J. 1, 3 (2014). 
41 See id. at 10. 
42 See Mason, supra note 22, at 517. 
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detection, and treatment processes.43 Another crucial example of  
the wide discretion granted to member institutions is in insurance 
coverage. While the NCAA mandates that athletes have health in-
surance upon entering school, it does not require schools to pay for 
any part of the athletes’ insurance.44 Thus, the NCAA gives univer-
sities the discretion to decide what kind of insurance students must 
obtain, which would potentially make coverage for injuries in the 
future far more expensive in terms of money and recovery time.45 It 
is evident that while student-athletes rely on the NCAA to protect 
them from injury and to help them handle injuries when they do  
occur, the NCAA—despite writing the rules and regulations them-
selves—instead redirects the responsibility and decision-making to 
member institutions.46 
C. Litigation vs. Settlement 
Despite an increase in litigation between the NCAA and former 
student-athletes over the last fifteen years, there still seems to be no 
significant case law pointing in favor of liability for negligence on 
the part of the NCAA. This is in part because the NCAA has the 
financial means in most cases to settle suits out of court.47 For ex-
ample, in 2017, a widow, Deb Hardin Ploetz, filed a complaint 
against the NCAA for negligently ignoring the signs of irreparable 
brain damage that her husband Greg had exhibited, which resulted 
from repetitive concussive hits.48 Unfortunately, Greg’s injury is 
one that many football players—at all levels, including college—
continue to sustain.49 Had this case resulted in a ruling against the 
NCAA, it easily could have established a landmark case; such a 
 
43 See id.  




46 Id.; see also When College Athletes Get Injured, TURCO L. (Nov. 7, 2019), 
https://www.massinjuryfirm.com/blog/2019/11/college-athletes/ [https://perma.cc/QK2T-
4ZNM]. 
47 See Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, A Verdict Could Have Changed the Tide, INSIDE HIGHER ED 
(June 26, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/06/26/settlement-highly-
anticipated-concussion-lawsuit-against-ncaa [https://perma.cc/6RDE-4Q2U]. 
48 See id. 
49 See id. 
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precedent might have invited a wave of litigation against the organ-
ization, and forced the NCAA into developing more stringent and 
effective regulations with respect to medical treatment for student-
athletes and the establishment of preventative measures.50 Unfortu-
nately, the court never had the opportunity to make such an impact 
on collegiate athletics. After just three days at trial, the parties set-
tled, and Mrs. Ploetz took home an undisclosed, presumptively 
large, sum of money instead.51 Furthermore, the details of the settle-
ment have not been disclosed to the public; outside of the NCAA 
and the Ploetz family, we will likely never know how much money 
was agreed upon or what arguments the NCAA made to get to this 
point.52 While the details of this settlement are not available, it can 
presumably be surmised that it, like many settlement agreements, 
involved a confidentiality agreement, which prevents any disclosure 
of facts that a successful suit may otherwise allow.53 
D. Lifelong Injuries Endured by Student-Athletes 
The first concern surrounding the long-term impact of athletic 
injury is proper treatment. The National Athletic Trainer’s Associa-
tion conducted a study, in which athletic trainers employed by 
NCAA member institutions throughout the country answered  
surveys regarding their roles as trainers in Division I athletic pro-
grams.54 The survey focused on instances in which coaches, trainers, 
or other members of their employer school intentionally ignored the 
symptoms of injury in student-athletes.55 Of the trainers who an-
swered the survey, an incredible 18.73% of trainers reported that a 
“coach play[ed] an athlete who had been deemed medically ineligi-
ble for participation” at some point during their time working with 
 
50 See id. 
51 See id. 
52 See id. 
53 See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Student-Athlete Concussion Injury Litig., 
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135682, at *46–47 (N.D. Ill. 2019). 
54 See Only Half of Collegiate-Level Sports Programs Follow Medical Model of Care 
for Student-Athletes, Survey Finds, NATA (June 26, 2019), https://www.nata.org/press-
release/062619/only-half-collegiate-level-sports-programs-follow-medical-model-care-
student [https://perma.cc/57Z7-WZ63]. 
55 See id. 
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a Division I program.56 While this number may not seem astronom-
ical, considering that there are over 460,000 student-athletes, with 
179,200 in Division I programs alone across the United States, the 
survey suggests that a significant number of athletes are being ig-
nored.57 This should draw attention to a serious problem caused by 
the significant delegation of power to the member universities by 
the NCAA: because there is not a strict nor specific protocol for 
member institutions to follow regarding medical treatment of stu-
dent-athletes, there is too much leeway for member institutions to 
avoid dealing with athletes’ injuries properly and thoroughly.58 
1. The Concussion Epidemic 
Much of the focus on injury of athletes has zeroed in on concus-
sion protocols and regulations. This is certainly a prominent issue 
for student-athletes in most sports, and the NCAA’s lack of enforce-
ment is beyond troubling. The NCAA released a statement that  
anywhere between 1.6 million and 3.8 million concussions occur 
annually as a result of participation in recreational activities and 
sports.59 Though much of the media attention focuses on concus-
sions as a result of the constant impacts in football, a large number 
of these injuries occur in other sports.60 
As previously mentioned, the NCAA did not create any type of 
concussion protocol for member institutions to adhere to until 2010, 
exactly a century after the creation of the organization.61 Despite the 
gap between the organization’s knowledge of the ongoing epidemic 
of traumatic head injuries and the implementation of effective 
 
56 Id. 
57 See Student-Athletes, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes [https://perma.cc/
XU5B-8MJ]. 
58 See sources cited supra note 46 and accompanying text; see also Dawson v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n/PAC-12 Conference, 932 F.3d 905, 908–09 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(explaining the relationship between member schools and the NCAA with regard to 
implementation and enforcement of violations of NCAA bylaws). 
59 Elizabeth Etherton, Systematic Negligence: The NCAA Concussion Management Plan 
and Its Limitations, 21 SPORTS L.J. 1, 2 (2014). 
60 See Sports-Related Head Injury, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEUROLOGICAL 
SURGEONS, https://www.aans.org/en/Patients/Neurosurgical-Conditions-and-Treatments/
Sports-related-Head-Injury [https://perma.cc/2XAJ-EFH2]. 
61 See Etherton, supra note 40, at 3. 
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regulation, the NCAA’s plan is still vague and potentially ineffec-
tive.62 Section 3.2.4.18 of the 2018–2019 Bylaws sets forth the 
guidelines for a Concussion Management Plan that active member 
institutions must follow.63 The “Concussion Safety Protocol” states 
that member institutions shall have, among other things, “baseline 
testing,” “procedures for reducing exposure to head injuries,” “pro-
cedures for education about concussions,” and procedures that “en-
sure that proper and appropriate concussion management” is exer-
cised.64 
While on its face the Bylaws seem to regulate concussion man-
agement in member institutions, they actually only do the bare min-
imum to appear effective. In fact, none of the supposed “require-
ments” actually specify what procedures members institutions must 
implement to protect students, just that some kind of procedure must 
exist.65 Despite its promises to protect student-athletes’ well-being, 
and its central organizational purpose to avoid head trauma, the 
NCAA continues to employ this type of language which leaves its 
empty protocols nearly completely to the discretion of member  
institutions—all in an effort to clear themselves of liability.66 
In Bradley v. NCAA, a female athlete sued the NCAA for negli-
gence and gross negligence after being improperly treated for a head 
injury while playing field hockey.67 Bradley was a member of the 
varsity field hockey team at American University in the fall of 
201168—one year after the NCAA finally implemented rules and 
regulations regarding concussion protocol.69 During a game against 
Richmond University, Bradley was hit in the head, after which she 
began to experience concussion-like symptoms.70 Despite her signs 
of head injury, Bradley continued playing in games and participating 
in practices with the field hockey team, and was not advised by any 
 
62 See id. 
63 See NCAA Division I Manual (2018–19), supra note 20, at 12. 
64 Id. 
65 See id. 
66 See sources cited supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
67 See Bradley v. NCAA, 249 F. Supp. 3d 149, 155 (D.D.C. 2017). 
68 See id. at 155–56. 
69 See id. at 162. 
70 See id. at 157. 
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member of the coaching, training, or university staff to sit out from 
athletic activity while her symptoms persisted.71 Bradley went on to 
sue the NCAA for negligence, alleging that the organization was 
“careless and negligent by breaching the duties of care it assumed 
for the benefit of the plaintiff”.72 
In response to the suit, the NCAA averred that it had no part in 
the medical decision made by the university or any healthcare  
provider with whom Bradley chose to consult.73 The NCAA also 
noted that because the NCAA was not aware of the injury, there 
should be no liability on behalf of the organization.74 In this  
instance, the NCAA pointed the finger at every other potentially  
responsible party to ensure they would avoid any and all liability  
for the student-athlete’s injury, which was sustained while compet-
ing in an NCAA-sanctioned athletic event.75 Though athletes like  
Bradley continue to trust the NCAA to protect their well-being, 
when the time comes for the organization to follow through  
with respect to treatment of injuries and medical care, it repeatedly 
evades liability.76 To accomplish this result, the NCAA has used 
several legal defenses.77 One argument is that there was never an 
enforceable agreement binding the organization to the protection of 
student-athletes.78 Furthermore, regardless of any possible agree-
ment with the NCAA, student-athletes tacitly agreed to the possibil-
ity of injury when participating in college athletics, thereby shield-
ing the NCAA from liability.79 
 
71 Id. 
72 Bradley, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 167. 
73 See id. 
74 See id. at 168. 
75 See generally id. 
76 See generally id. at 167. 
77 The NCAA’s first argument in Bradley was that her “claim is about the medical care 
she received from other people, not the NCAA,” despite the fact that the NCAA has an 
agreement with those “other people” (i.e., university staff, coaches, trainers, etc.), to ensure 
the safety of student-athletes. 249 F. Supp. 3d at 167. 
78 See id. at 171–73. 
79 See id. at 167. 
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2. Beyond the Concussion Focus—Other Long-Term Injuries 
Despite the undeniable severity of repeated head injuries and the 
attention from athletes on concussion protocol and reform, some of 
the most prevalent injuries sustained by student-athletes are  
ligament and muscle tears, many of which have proven to be  
career-ending for athletes.80 These extremely common injuries  
typically produce both “devastating short-term and long-term  
consequences.”81 The long-term symptoms and complications of 
certain knee injuries, such as ACL and MCL tears, include “pain, 
functional impairment, and early onset crippling arthritis, which can 
cause disability, handicap, and distress.”82 These long-term effects 
can lead to multiple expensive surgeries, long-term pain, and overall 
risks and discomfort for the rest of one’s life.83 
According to a study published in 2017, 67% of a polled group 
of former student-athletes had sustained a “major injury” while 
competing, and 50% had reported “chronic” and long-lasting pain 
or symptoms.84 Further, studies show that 40% of former student-
athletes suffer from osteoarthritis after they retire from college  
athletics, compared to 24% of the general, non-athlete student pop-
ulation after such students graduate from college.85 There is clearly 
a significant risk of long-term injury in all forms of collegiate  
athletic participation, about which student-athletes have received 
neither adequate warning nor preparation, even after purportedly 
reading a 440-page agreement from the NCAA.86 This is especially 
true with respect to the long-term effects that athletic play has on  
female athletes.87 
 
80 See Mason, supra note 22, at 515 (emphasis added). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 See id. 
84 Ian McMahan, Former College Athletics Chronic Injuries and Health Issues, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.si.com/edge/2017/10/31/former-college-
athletes-chronic-injuries-health-issues [https://perma.cc/BM75-A79T]. 
85 Id. 
86 Despite stating that they have read the 440-page bylaws when signing eligibility 
agreements, it is reasonable to assume that most 18-year-old student-athletes have not 
actually read the entire document, if any of it. 
87 See Mason, supra note 22, at 514–15. 
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Perhaps the most ignored concern in college sports is the long-
term impact that participation in most Division I varsity athletics  
has on female student-athletes. Studies show that because of the sig-
nificant difference between male and female anatomy, female ath-
letes endure physical injuries very differently than male athletes.88 
This results in a higher number of injuries for female athletes, as the 
structure of college athletics and training is geared primarily  
towards male athletes.89 For example, because female athletes  
generally have smaller heads and weaker necks, they are more likely 
to suffer a concussion after a less forceful impact than their  
male counterparts.90 
Women are also significantly more prone to knee injuries,  
specifically ACL tears.91 This is because women are already predis-
posed to bone density issues, with many women experiencing oste-
oporosis into their adult years; unfortunately, the structure of 
workouts and gameplay in college athletics directly affect this pre-
disposition.92 Further, studies show that heavy exercise such as that 
required of student-athletes in college suppresses proper hormone 
function, which can lead to higher risks of fractures and bone related 
injuries.93 The impact that heavy exercise has on female athletes is 
often irreversible, and can leave women with permanent problems 
and lifelong symptoms long after an initial injury.94 As a former  
Division I female athlete, this Note’s author can authoritatively say 
from personal experience that women are not warned of the unique  
risks that are inherent to participating as a female athlete in most 
college sports. 
 
88 See id. 
89 See id. 
90 Id. 
91 See id. at 515. 
92 See id. at 515–16. 
93 See id. at 516. 
94 Id. 
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II. LEGAL TOOLS USED BY THE NCAA TO EVADE LIABILITY 
A. In Loco Parentis 
The relationship between student-athletes and the NCAA is  
defined in many cases as that of a special relationship.95 In the case 
of a special relationship, a defendant party is responsible for a harm 
to the plaintiff party when the harm is reasonably foreseeable to the 
defendant and there is a connection between the harm caused and 
the defendant’s conduct.96 This idea of the “special relationship” has 
evolved over time with respect to the relationship between universi-
ties and students. The relationship was once viewed as that of a more 
guardian-like relationship, but has since evolved into the  
modern view that the relationship is more contractual in nature.97 
Before the courts can examine the relationship between student-
athletes and the NCAA, they must review the history of the way 
courts have understood the relationship between students and uni-
versities, and how that relationship has evolved over time. The doc-
trine of in loco parentis was an early concept of what the relationship 
between educational institutions and students should be; schools 
were meant to “stand in the shoes of parents,” which created an ele-
vated special duty toward students.98 In essence, a school would as-
sume the parental role over students, and thus the level of liability 
expected for institutions would be that of a parent-child relation-
ship.99 Therefore, because the relationship was meant to replace that 
of the “child-parent” in which the school “stands in the shoes” of the 
parents, in loco parentis was not intended to be upheld like a con-
tractual relationship.100 Instead, the relationship existed through the 
power and rights of the university in their ability to “exercise control 
 
95 See id. at 521–22. 
96 See id. at 521. 
97 See generally id. 
98 VICTORIA J. DODD, PRACTICAL EDUCATION LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
251–52 (2d ed. 2010). 
99 See generally K.B. Melear, From In Loco Parentis to Consumerism: Legal Analysis 
of the Contractual Relationship Between Institution and Student, 40 NASPA J. 124 (2003). 
100 DODD, supra note 98, at 251. 
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over students.”101 With this broad power, universities had the ability 
to enforce rules and regulations over students.102 
Over time, however, this doctrine has proved problematic in 
many cases involving universities and students who expect certain 
guarantees when they pay for an advanced education.103 For in-
stance, in cases involving public schools, courts have generally dis-
carded the concept of in loco parentis entirely, either through case 
law or legislation, with the exception of a few specific areas in which 
the doctrine is still used.104 The shift in the role of the university 
with relation to students can be described as moving away from the 
in loco parentis relationship, which would replace the parental figure 
for students, to a more contractual relationship, in which universities 
are providers and students are consumers.105 Thus, there has been a 
change in the judicial understanding of the relationship between  
universities and students, as well as a change in the role of higher  
education institutions in society, and more specifically, the eco-
nomic market.106 This shift to “student consumerism” is representa-
tive of the “marketplace competition among institutions and a recog-
nition that students have economic and property interests which  
deserve legal protection.”107 
When analyzing the student-university relationship, courts have 
relied on student handbooks, manuals, university publications and 
bulletins, syllabi and specific courses from schools, curriculum 
guidelines, and other similar types of documents to show that a con-
tractual relationship exists between students and universities.108 
These types of documents highlight the obligations that the univer-
sities owe to their consumer student body.109 This type of analysis 
depicts the shift in judicial review of the relationship between  
 
101 Melear, supra note 99, at 127. 
102 See id. 
103 DODD, supra note 98, at 252–53. 
104 See id. (explaining that in loco parentis is not really used in reference to liability of 
schools anymore, except in cases of school searches and civil liability in cases of sexual 
misconduct). 
105 Melear, supra note 99, at 124. 
106 See id. 
107 Id. 
108 See id. at 125. 
109 Id. 
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universities and students from that of overseer and student, to a  
contractual relationship based in the framework of a competitive 
economic market.110 Such a shift has seemingly been limited to the  
educational relationship between universities and students. This 
Note, in contrast, aims to address how this shift in legal analysis of 
relationships between universities and students should also be ap-
plied to the relationship between student-athletes and the NCAA, 
another athletic and academic organization overseeing students. 
As described above, the in loco parentis doctrine has been 
slowly dying out with respect to the relationship between universi-
ties and students. Courts are instead looking to contract theory in 
analyzing this relationship. In so doing, courts embrace the notion 
that the world of higher education is a competitive marketplace, and 
that students are able to bargain and negotiate regarding the price, 
type, and level of education for which they pay, the same way con-
sumers do in any other market.111 Why is it that courts do not use 
the same university-student analysis, documentary evidence, and 
view of the marketplace, when analyzing the tort liabilities  
currently allocated between student-athletes and universities and  
the NCAA? 
B. Duty of Care and Special Relationship 
Before the assumption-of-risk defense can be used, a tort claim 
for negligence has to be made. The first step in establishing a negli-
gence claim is to determine whether or not a duty is owed to the 
plaintiff by the defendant in a case.112 Determination of the duty 
owed by a defendant to a plaintiff is based on both statute and pol-
icy.113 With respect to collegiate athletics, administrations that  
organize athletic programs have the duty to use “reasonable care to 
protect students from anticipated and preventable injuries.”114  
Additionally, such organizations owe student-athletes the duty to 
 
110 See id. at 125–26. 
111 See id. at 138–39. 
112 See Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 103–04 (Cal. 1963). 
113 See Davidson v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 142 N.C. App. 544, 552 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2001). 
114 Denner, supra note 12, at 217 (citing Samuel Langerman & Noel Fidel, Sports 
Injury—Negligence, 15 AM. JUR. 2d PROOF OF FACTS §§ 1, 8 (2002)). 
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not increase any potential risks, such as through use of inadequate 
equipment or facilities.115 While this may seem straightforward, 
there has been much uncertainty regarding the contractual relation-
ship between athletes and the NCAA.116 
The special relationship between student-athletes and the NCAA 
creates a specific kind of duty of care owed. The NCAA and mem-
ber institutions, as organizers of athletic activities on the collegiate 
level, have a duty of reasonable care to protect athletes “from inju-
ries arising out of unassumed, concealed, or unreasonably increased 
risks.”117 The existence of such a duty suggests that there should be 
some liability on the shoulders of the NCAA and member institu-
tions.118 Despite the seemingly clear special relationship, courts tend 
to reject the argument that such a duty exists when circumstances 
involving lifelong injuries of student-athletes reach the point of  
litigation. 
To refer back to the case in Bradley, the student-athlete stated 
that the NCAA had failed its “duties” to “protect the physical and 
mental well-being of all student-athletes participating in intercolle-
giate sports,” including protection from brain injuries.119 The court 
concluded that despite the nature of the formal agreements between 
the student-athlete and the NCAA, those documents were not con-
sidered enforceable contracts because they merely acted as confir-
mation that student-athletes were familiar with the guidelines and 
regulations enforceable against them, or that the signed forms were 
simply “requests” from the NCAA for information from the ath-
letes.120 The court stated that Bradley had not “identified a valid, 
enforceable contract wherein the NCAA agreed to protect the phys-
ical and mental well-being of student-athletes,”121 despite the fact 
that such language is written in the early pages of the exact same 
 
115 Id. 
116 See infra Part II.C. 
117 Bukowski v. Clarkson Univ., 86 A.D.3d 736, 736 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011). 
118 See id. 
119 Bradley v. NCAA, 249 F. Supp. 3d 149, 171 (D.D.C. 2017). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
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Bylaws, which again the athletes are expected to have fully read  
before signing their participation agreements.122 
This judicial result stems from student-athletes’ unique yet  
unfortunate legal circumstances. Unlike professional athletes, stu-
dent-athletes are not protected by employment contracts, and unlike 
when they participated in youth athletic programs, they are no 
longer protected by their status as minors, or by their parents or 
guardians.123 Thus, student-athletes are often left in limbo between 
what they might understand to be a contractual obligation from the 
NCAA to protect their well-being, and the legal reality of being on 
their own to figure things out once they become injured.124 
According to the special relationship doctrine, a plaintiff is usu-
ally in one way or another “particularly vulnerable and dependent 
upon the defendant who, correspondingly, holds considerable power 
over the plaintiff’s welfare.”125 This is especially true in cases where 
the defendant holds an economic power or advantage over the plain-
tiff.126 In Lamorie v. Warner Pacific College,127 a college basketball 
player broke his nose and injured his eyed during recreational activ-
ity.128 Despite being instructed by doctors that he should not partic-
ipate in athletic activity until his injuries were healed, Lamorie con-
tinued to play out of fear of losing his scholarship after his coach 
asked him to play anyway.129 This forced the court to consider 
whether a student-athlete can legitimately volunteer to the risk of 
injury when they are fearful of losing a scholarship and feel pres-
sured to continue to play despite serious injury.130 However, in such 
cases, experienced organizations like the NCAA’s hands remain 
 
122 See generally NCAA Division I Manual (2018–19), supra note 20. 
123 See Mason, supra note 22, at 517. 
124 See generally, e.g., Bradley, 249 F. Supp. 3d 149; Davidson v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel 
Hill, 142 N.C. App. 544 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). 
125 Davidson, 142 N.C. App. at 554. 
126 See id. at 554–55. 
127 850 P.2d 401 (Ore. Ct. App. 1993). 
128 See Jeff Kessler, Note, Dollar Signs on the Muscle . . . and the Ligament, Tendon, and 
Ulnar Nerve: Institutional Liability Arising from Injuries to Student-Athletes, 3 VA. J. 
SPORTS & L. 80, 96–97 (2001). 
129 See id. 
130 See generally Lamorie, 850 P.2d 401.  
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clean while most of the liability falls on the coaches, school staff, 
and member institutions.131 
Such cases involving a special relationship may lead to concerns 
of negligence when the more powerfully situated defendant’s omis-
sion results in such negligence.132 Typically, the special relationship 
doctrine is used to describe the legal understanding of other kinds of 
vulnerable relationships, such as the doctor-patient relationship.133 
Many courts have determined that the duty owed to student-athletes 
from the NCAA and universities is also that of a special relation-
ship.134 Authorities have defined a special-relationship as histori-
cally having been based on an “existence of mutual dependence” 
between parties.135 In the case of student-athlete relationships with 
the NCAA, there is a clear relationship of mutual dependence.  
Student-athletes clearly rely on the organization to protect them 
from unnecessary physical harm and to ensure they get the education 
they are promised, and the NCAA depends on the student-athletes 
to help their programs grow in financial success and create a favor-
able image of college athletics.136 
While there is clearly an unbalanced power dynamic between 
student-athletes and the universities, courts continue to ignore the 
duties owed to athletes by the NCAA. Whether economic, aca-
demic, or otherwise, universities and the NCAA have a significant 
advantage vis-à-vis student-athletes, who are clearly the more vul-
nerable and dependent party in the relationship.137 In Davidson v. 
University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, the state court determined 
that a special relationship existed between the university and a mem-
ber of the university’s cheerleading squad.138 Emphasizing the  
importance of a relationship of mutual dependence, the court con-
cluded that it was clear that the university benefited from having 
 
131 See id. 
132 See Davidson, 142 N.C. App. at 554–55. 
133 See Kessler, supra note 128, at 92. 
134 Id. 
135 Davidson, 142 N.C. App. at 555. 
136 NCAA Division I Manual (2018–19), supra note 20, at xii (stating the objectives of 
the NCAA and the promise to protect student-athletes from injury in exchange for their 
compliance and continued eligibility). 
137 See Davidson, 142 N.C. App. at 554. 
138 See id. at 544. 
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Davidson, along with the other members of the cheerleading squad, 
on the team and as athletic representatives for their school.139  
The court explained that “UNC depended upon the cheerleading 
program for a variety of benefits . . . [they were] responsible for 
cheerleading at JV basketball games, women’s basketball games, 
and wrestling events . . . [they] represented UNC at a trade show, 
and often entertained the Rams Club before games.”140 Thus, the 
court concluded that the relationship between the athletes and the 
university was in fact mutually dependent, even without considera-
tion of the additional economic dependence which weighs heavily 
in cases of athletic programs that make huge profits for certain  
universities.141 
While this mutual dependence argument may be valid, this form 
of mutual dependence is not evenly distributed in the relationship 
between universities and student-athletes. A special relationship can 
exist in instances where one party exerts a higher degree of control 
over the other party to the relationship.142 In Davidson, the court 
concluded that, because UNC had such a high degree of control over 
the student-athlete’s life, it should be presumed that the student 
would expect a rational level of care and protection from their  
respective university.143 The tenuous relationship between the 
NCAA and student-athletes is partly to blame on the relationships 
that exist between the NCAA and member institutions. It is clear 
that the NCAA does not want to be liable for anything in the tort 
arena regarding student-athletes, and such sentiment is reflected in 
their bylaws.144 
Courts have further emphasized the significance of the “relation-
ship of mutual dependence” between a university and student-ath-
lete in cases where a student has been actively recruited by  
a school.145 When student-athletes are actively recruited by 
 
139 See id. at 555. 
140 Id. 
141 See id. at 555–56. 
142 See id. at 555. 
143 See id. at 555–56. 
144 See generally NCAA Division I Manual (2018–19), supra note 20. 
145 Kessler, supra note 128, at 82 (citing Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d 
1360, 1367 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
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universities or when they are recipients of scholarships, there has 
clearly been a mutual exchange made in the establishment of that 
relationship.146 Thus, while students depend on the NCAA to edu-
cate and protect them with respect to athletically related injuries,  
the NCAA undoubtedly relies on athletes in order to stay  
in business.147 
Despite existing case law and scholarship which emphasizes the 
importance of the special relationship between universities and  
athletes, there is far less grounding in the relationship between the 
NCAA and student-athletes.148 However, it is clear that, as with  
universities, there is in fact a special-relationship between the 
NCAA and student-athletes. This special relationship arises out of 
the fact that the NCAA has access to “superior knowledge” over 
student-athletes with respect to the inherent risks of athletic partici-
pation and the general inner workings of higher education and col-
lege athletics.149 
C. Relationship Between the NCAA and Student-Athletes 
It is clear that the nature of the relationship between student-ath-
letes and the NCAA is that of mutual, but not equal, dependence. 
Many discrepancies exist with regard to this relationship  
because of the nature of student-athletes’ “contracts” (or lack 
thereof), according to many courts.150 The rationale is that student-
athletes are not technically “employees” of a university nor the 
NCAA.151 Thus, even though a court may find that there was an 
agreement, said agreement would not be enforceable as a 
 
146 See Davidson, 142 N.C. App. at 556 (noting, with regard to the special relationship 
doctrine, the emphasis that the Third Circuit placed on the significance of colleges actively 
recruiting students for their athletic programs). 
147 See Where Does the Money Go?, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/
Where%20Does%20the%20Money%20Go-WEB.PDF [https://perma.cc/KX3Y-QEM4]. 
148 See, e.g., Bukowski v. Clarkson Univ., 86 A.D.3d 736, 737 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011) 
(holding that “[o]rganizers of sporting activities owe a duty to exercise reasonable care to 
protect participants from . . . unreasonably increased risks”); Davidson, 142 N.C. App. at 
555 (holding that a special relationship existed between the student-athlete and the 
university). 
149 See Mason, supra note 22, at 527–28. 
150 See, e.g., Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n/PAC-12 Conference, 932 F.3d 
905, 907 (9th Cir. 2019). 
151 See id. at 908. 
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contract.152 The NCAA argues that because they are a “voluntary, 
unincorporated association composed of 1,100 autonomous member  
institutions with [athletic] programs,” they do not have a “special 
relationship” with any of the 490,000 student-athletes whom they 
promise to protect; the special relationship is between the athletes 
and autonomous member institutions.153 However, the NCAA  
requires that student-athletes sign an agreement that they agree to all 
provisions and bylaws of the NCAA handbook, in order to be eligi-
ble to participate in collegiate athletics.154 Further, student-athletes 
participating in Division I athletics are required to sign a series of 
agreements, many of which touch upon medical treatment and  
protocols, insurance policies, and liability of universities, student-
athletes, and the NCAA.155 For example, a student-athlete in a Divi-
sion I program almost certainly would have to sign a Student- 
Athlete Concussion Statement, which explains the proper concus-
sion protocols and means by which member institutions and the 
NCAA purport to protect athletes.156 
While courts adamantly reject the idea that student-athletes are 
employees of universities consorting with the NCAA, such judicial 
precedent still does not preclude the existence of a contractual rela-
tionship between the NCAA and student-athletes. Yet, despite the 
seemingly “contract-like” nature of the agreements from the per-
spective of the students who are required to sign them, courts often 
have decided that such agreements between students and the NCAA 
are not enforceable contracts.157 For example, in 2018, in Dawson v. 
NCAA/PAC-12 Conference, Division I athlete Lamar Dawson 
brought a suit against the NCAA (as well as his university’s athletic 
conference), wherein he argued that he was an employee of both the 
NCAA and PAC-12 Conference under the definition of the Fair  
Labor and Standards Act and state labor laws in the state of 
 
152 See id. 
153 Greiber v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 2017 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5234, at *11 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Sept. 5, 2017). 
154 See Student-Athlete Statement, supra note 25. 
155 See Bradley v. NCAA, 249 F. Supp. 3d 149, 171 (D.D.C. 2017). 
156 See id. at 171–72. 
157 See id. at 172. 
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California.158 In the suit, Dawson contended that the NCAA acts as 
an employer to student-athletes by “prescribing the terms and con-
ditions under which student-athletes perform services” as per the 
NCAA Bylaws.159 Dawson further argued that though the NCAA 
did not directly grant scholarships to athletes, the bylaws do stipu-
late regulations and requirements regarding scholarships, specifi-
cally limitations on the distribution thereof.160 The court rejected 
this argument, and instead stated that the “economic reality” of the 
relationship is not indicative of an employment relationship;  
because Dawson did not receive a scholarship directly from the 
NCAA, Dawson and other student-athletes did not constitute the  
association’s employees.161 The court further stated that despite the 
economic benefits that the NCAA gains from collegiate athletics, 
such revenue does not “automatically engender or foreclose the  
existence of an employment relationship.”162 In other words, the 
Ninth Circuit found the NCAA’s revenues to be non-dispositive. 
Comparing this directly with professional organizations such as 
the National Football League (“NFL”) and the National Basketball 
League (“NBA”), there is a significant difference in bargaining 
power between athletes and their superiors in such agreements, 
whether they are considered employees or not.163 Professional ath-
letes have the means to hire attorneys and representatives, who can 
assist in bargaining with their employers regarding contracts,  
including salary, medical treatment and insurance, and so on.164 Pro-
fessional athletes also have collective bargaining agreements 
(“CBAs”) which are “negotiated between the player’s labor union 
and the league and the standard player contract[s] which an athlete 
signs govern the team’s duty to provide an injured player with med-
ical treatment.”165 However, student-athletes do not have this lux-
ury, and instead are told that, in order to be eligible and participate 
 
158 See Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n/PAC-12 Conference, 932 F.3d 905, 
907 (9th Cir. 2019). 
159 Id. at 908. 
160 See id. at 909. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 910. 
163 See Denner, supra note 12, at 229. 
164 See id. 
165 See id. 
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in collegiate athletics, they must sign on and agree to all aspects of 
the NCAA Bylaws.166 Whether or not the student-athletes are 
viewed as employees should not matter when the agreement is 
clearly so one-sided and the students have nearly zero bargaining 
power in the exchange.167 
Beyond the signed agreements between athletes and the NCAA, 
courts have also generally held that student-athlete handbooks are 
not enforceable with respect to liability or obligations of the NCAA. 
This is the case even though the NCAA Bylaws are enforceable 
against student-athletes themselves, which seems patently unfair.168 
In Knelman v. Middlebury College, a student-athlete argued that he 
was a third-party beneficiary to the contractual agreement between 
the NCAA and Middlebury College.169 The student argued that  
student-athletes have the right to enforce the provisions of the 
NCAA Manual, as students should be considered “intended third-
party beneficiaries” of the college’s contract with the NCAA.170 As 
the student reasoned, because the NCAA imposed regulations on 
student-athletes through the agreement with member institutions, 
athletes should also reap the protections promised in such an agree-
ment.171 Despite Knelman’s compelling arguments, the Second Cir-
cuit held that the NCAA did not have a contractual duty to uphold 
its rules and regulations for a student-athlete.172 The court compared 
Knelman’s case to other Second Circuit decisions in stating that, 
though it was clear that the NCAA rules and regulations are essential 
to the functionality of athletics in member institutions, it is “not 
clear . . . that this fact is sufficient to elevate a student from an inci-
dental to an intended beneficiary” and therefore, there is no breach 
of contract, because there is no obligation to the athlete.173 The court  
insisted that the manual contained nothing regarding “fairness” in 
 
166 See generally NCAA Division I Manual (2018–19), supra note 20. 
167 See Denner, supra note 12, at 229. 
168 See Knelman v. Middlebury Coll., 898 F. Supp. 2d 697, 713 (D. Vt. 2012). 
169 See id. at 713–14. 
170 Id. at 713–15. 
171 See NCAA Division I Manual (2018–19), supra note 20, at xii. 
172 Knelman, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 714. 
173 Id. at 715; see also Phillip v. Fairfield Univ., 118 F.3d 131, 135 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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treatment of student-athletes; the manual is meant to show eligibility 
requirements and regulations for coaches and student-athletes.174 
Essentially, courts have held that the “agreement” between  
student-athletes and the NCAA is not a contract, but rather a set of 
guidelines and regulations with which the student-athletes must 
maintain compliance for eligibility to play collegiate sports.175 Some 
courts take this argument further by holding that because the NCAA 
does not receive any “benefits” from the relationship with the stu-
dent-athletes, any agreements between athletes and the NCAA  
cannot be viewed as “employment contract[s],” or as an obligatory 
contract whatsoever.176 However, because the premise of these 
courts’ reasoning is flawed in that the NCAA clearly benefits finan-
cially from student-athlete participation, the agreement should in-
stead be viewed as an enforceable contract between the athletes and 
the NCAA.177 
The pact between student-athletes and the NCAA consists, on 
the one hand, of athletes agreeing to abide by the rules and regula-
tions set forth in the NCAA Bylaws and participating in varsity  
college athletics. In exchange, the NCAA promises a “commitment 
[to the] student-athlete[s’] well-being.”178 While many courts have 
held that this is not a contractual arrangement, it is apparent that 
such an agreement could reasonably be viewed as an illusory con-
tract.179 Such an agreement between the NCAA and student-athletes 
clearly contains an illusory promise; the NCAA makes a promise to 
athletes to “protect their well-being,” but then argues in court, to 
avoid liability, that they are not contractually obligated to uphold 
that promise.180 
 
174 Knelman, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 713–14. 
175 Id. at 713. 
176 Kessler, supra note 128, at 106. 
177 See id. at 106. 
178 NCAA Division I Manual (2018–19), supra note 20, at 12. 
179 See Illusory Contract Law and Legal Definition, US LEGAL, https://definitions.
uslegal.com/i/illusory-contract/ [https://perma.cc/5BKZ-KK5X] (illusory contract is 
defined as “a contract between two parties in which the consideration for the contract is 
illusory . . . one party gives as consideration a promise that is so insubstantial that it would 
not result in or impose any obligations”). 
180 NCAA Division I Manual (2018–19), supra note 20, at 12. 
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Another reason the relationship between the NCAA and student-
athletes should be viewed as a contract is the athlete recruiting  
process. In many cases, student-athletes are recruited by universities 
because of their athletic ability and what the athlete will potentially 
bring to a team, athletic program, or university.181 The recruiting 
process is extensive; an athlete must pay to register with the NCAA 
eligibility center, follow specific contact periods in which they are 
allowed to communicate directly with coaches and schools, attend 
official visits with schools, and sign an agreement with the school 
and the NCAA called the “Letter of Intent” expressing their intent 
to commit to athletic participation at that school.182 This Letter of 
Intent is a binding agreement, in which a student-athlete commits  
to one academic year at the member institution, whether or not  
they actually play on their team.183 Despite being defined as and 
viewed as a “binding agreement” between the NCAA and a student-
athlete, the NCAA still disputes that any enforceable contract exists 
between them.184 
D. Assumption of Risk Doctrine 
In response to complaints of negligence and liability resulting 
from long-term injuries, the NCAA has repeatedly responded to  
litigation by employing the affirmative defense of assumption of 
risk.185 This doctrine is prominent in tort law, especially in the con-
text of sports-related injuries.186 The assumption-of-risk doctrine 
states that when an individual voluntarily participates in a sporting, 
recreational, or otherwise dangerous activity, they accept the inher-
ent dangers that are associated with the activity so selected.187 This 
means that a participant on an athletic team assumes the risk of that 
activity, and therefore accepts liability for injuries that may result 
 
181 See Recruiting, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/future/recruiting 
[https://perma.cc/2XVL-RCNT]. 
182 Id. 
183 About the National Letter of Intent, NAT’L LETTER OF INTENT, http://www.national
letter.org/aboutTheNli/index.html [https://perma.cc/S7N2-GFJA]. 
184 Greiber v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 2017 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5234, at *11 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2017). 
185 See generally Dennie, supra note 16. 
186 See generally Denner, supra note 12. 
187 See Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 250 N.Y. 479, 482 (N.Y. 1929). 
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from the inherent risks of the sport.188 However, potential dangers 
that are not inherent, not reasonably foreseen, are hidden, or are  
so egregious that necessary precautions should have been taken  
to remedy the potential risk, are not covered by the assumption of 
risk doctrine.189 The assumption of risk may be either expressed 
clearly in a waiver (an explicit written contract) or implied based  
on context.190 
Because it is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the  
burden of proof and persuasion for showing assumption of risk; 
however, if met, the affirmative defense fully negates liability.191 In  
order for assumption of risk to apply, the defendant must meet two 
factors; (1) that the plaintiff or participant knew of the potential  
danger of the activity, with a complete understanding of the full de-
gree of danger at risk, and (2) that the plaintiff or participant volun-
tarily took part in the activity in question, knowing the potential 
risks.192 The contention that student-athletes have “complete under-
standing” of the inherent risks of their activity with respect to col-
lege athletics revolves heavily upon how the two different parties 
define the term “inherent” with respect to the dangers of the athletic 
participation. In the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “inherent” is 
broadly defined as being innate or characteristic of something, a  
definition that is clearly up to interpretation.193 That being said, what 
is considered “inherent” to an eighteen-year-old in their first year of 
college may very well radically differ from what a 100-year-old  
organization specializing in sports-injury prevention and backed by 
scores of financiers, insurance policies, and lawyers might interpret 
as “inherent.” Yet, regardless of the definition employed, as cur-
rently implemented by the courts in college athletics, such “inhe-
 
188 Id. at 483. 
189 See id. 
190 Id. 
191 Affirmative Defense, CORNELL LAW SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.
edu/wex/affirmative_defense [https://perma.cc/M4WQ-BSW2]. 
192 See Denner, supra note 12, at 210–12. 
193 Inherent, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/inherent [https://perma.cc/G499-VZXS]. 
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rent” risks can be waived by the athletic participant, either expressly 
or implicitly.194 
In Cameron v. University of Toledo, after being actively  
recruited by the school, Kyle Cameron began his freshman year at 
the University of Toledo as a member of the football team.195 In the 
summer before his freshman year of college, Cameron participated 
in the “Freshman Olympics” with the university’s football team, in 
which freshman were instructed by the upper-classmen of the team 
to partake in various athletic and physical challenges.196 During one 
of the challenges, Cameron was seriously injured when he fell on 
his head and neck, experienced a seizure, and, as he later learned, 
suffered serious brain damage.197 These injuries subsequently ended 
Cameron’s athletic career forever.198 Alleging that the school was 
liable for his injuries on the basis of negligence, Cameron then filed 
a suit against the school and coaching staff which stemmed heavily 
on concerns of hazing.199 The court, however, held that such injuries 
were inherent to his participation on the football team: because the 
Freshmen Olympics were related to football activity, the voluntary 
participation had an inherent risk of injury.200 It is clear that the court 
in Cameron defined the application of “inherent risks” very broadly, 
far beyond what a reasonable freshman athlete would assume, espe-
cially at the very outset of their collegiate career. Furthermore, how 
could Cameron have assumed the risk of getting a seizure during an 
“Olympics” event when he joined the football team and never once 
stepped on the field? This holding continues to raise questions about 
the unfair legal results that seriously injured student-athletes are 
achieving currently in the courts. 
 
194 Tom Baker et al., Waiver and Estoppel—Part 1, ALI ADVISOR (May 17, 2018), 
http://www.thealiadviser.org/liability-insurance/waiver-and-estoppel-part-1/ 
[https://perma.cc/2M6H-A8WV]. 
195 98 N.E.3d 305, 309 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018). 
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197 See id. at 309–10. 
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E. Waiver and Expressed Assumption of Risk 
Express assumptions of risk are inherent risks of an activity or 
sport that are made clear to the participant, for which the plaintiff 
waives the ability to hold a defendant liable for their negligent  
or reckless actions in advance.201 In an express contract, form, or 
writing, a plaintiff who “expressly agrees to accept a risk of harm 
arising from the defendant’s negligent or reckless conduct cannot 
recover of such harm, unless the agreement is invalid as contrary to 
public policy.”202 
A waiver acts as a contractual agreement between parties in 
which the parties agree that one will participate in the activity or 
sport, and in exchange will not hold the other party legally respon-
sible for certain results of the participation.203 The Restatement of 
Contracts defines a waiver as “a writing providing that a duty owed 
to the maker of the release is discharged immediately or on the  
occurrence of a condition.”204 However, in order for a waiver to be 
valid, the waiver must “clearly communicate the risks involved in 
the activity and that it is the participant who waives his or her right 
to sue” when participating in an organized activity.205 In Tunkl v. 
Regents of University of California, the Supreme Court of California 
established a test to determine whether a waiver is valid by balanc-
ing several factors.206 Under the Tunkl doctrine, there are six factors 
that the court considers: 
(1) the agreement concerns an endeavor of a type 
generally thought suitable for public regulation; 
(2)   the party seeking exculpation is engaged in 
performing a service of great importance to the 
public, which is often a matter of practical 
necessity for some members of the public; 
(3)  such party holds itself out as willing to perform 
this service for any member of the public who 
 
201 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
202 Id. § 496B. 
203 See Gina Pauline et al., Do Entry Form Waivers Properly Inform Triathlon 
Participants of the Dangers of the Sport?, 26 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 106, 109 (2016). 
204 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 284 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
205 See Pauline et al., supra note 203, at 109. 
206 See Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 98–99 (1963). 
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seeks it, or at least for any member of the public 
coming within certain established standards; 
(4)  the party seeking the exculpation possesses a 
decisive advantage of bargaining strength 
against any member of the public who seeks the 
services; 
(5)  in exercising a superior bargaining power, the 
party confronts the public with a standardized 
adhesion contract of exculpation and makes no 
provision whereby those receiving services may 
pay additional reasonable fees and obtain 
protection against negligence; and 
(6)  the person or members of the public seeking 
such services must be placed under the control 
of the furnisher of the services, subject to the 
risk of carelessness on the part of the furnishers, 
its employees, or its agents.207 
These factors take into consideration fairness, the legality of the 
waiver, and how the waiver holds up against public policy inter-
ests.208 These criteria are not a definitive test to determine whether 
a waiver is valid. Instead, the Tunkl factors are applied on a case-by-
case basis, and when the waiver in question runs up against multiple 
factors, it is more likely to be considered invalid by a court of law.209 
However, when it comes to waivers between the NCAA and stu-
dent-athletes, the Tunkl analysis becomes murkier, as most agree-
ments between the two parties use implicit waiver language as op-
posed to express waiver language.210 
F. Implicit Waiver 
The greatest argument against plaintiffs in sports injury litiga-
tion has been the application of the assumption-of-risk doctrine, in-
sisting that a waiver has been made on behalf of the student-athlete 
implicitly through their willingness to participate in the sport.211 The 
 
207 Kessler, supra note 128, at 83 (citing Tunkl, 60 Cal. 2d at 98–99). 
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209 See Kessler, supra note 128, at 84. 
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assumption-of-risk defense is a complete bar against liability in 
sports injury, based on the rationale that there is no duty of care 
owed to an athlete for the injuries caused by the “inherent risks of 
the sport or activity.”212 This assumption is drawn from the idea of 
implicit waiver, which is a waiver that is presumed based on a par-
ticipant’s behavior in an activity.213 Many cases have concluded that 
student-athletes have assumed the risks inherent to their respective 
sports under this doctrine, thus relieving the NCAA from liability 
for their injuries.214 
However, by simply agreeing to participate in varsity sports, stu-
dent-athletes are not necessarily consenting to extensive and less  
obvious potential injuries to the sport—injuries that a professional 
organization such as the NCAA is better equipped to monitor, un-
derstand, and guard against. The NCAA is more well-suited because 
it has observed all of the potential risks, injuries, and consequences 
in a variety of athletic settings since its inception over a hundred 
years ago.215 Therefore, the NCAA has more knowledge of the  
“inherent risks” of college sports than almost any other organization 
possibly could have. Student-athletes, meanwhile, at seventeen- to 
eighteen-years-old, agree to participate in Division I athletics, armed 
only with their own limited knowledge of what they reasonably  
believe to be the inherent risks of their participation in a particular 
sport.216 As Cameron demonstrates, sometimes the injuries that are 
held to be “inherently” accepted are those which occur off the field 
and not even during the “assumed” athletic activity.217 
A large number of negligence and liability cases revolve around 
the advantage held by member institutions and the NCAA over stu-
dent-athletes with respect to a comprehensible understanding of the 
truly “inherent” risks to athletic participation. For instance, in Rose 
v. NCAA, two former Division I football players from Purdue 
 
212 Mason, supra note 22, at 522. 
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University brought a suit against the NCAA, alleging that the asso-
ciation was “uniquely aware of the risks of repetitive brain trauma 
and, yet, exposed players to those risks with no regard for the play-
ers’ health and safety.”218 The plaintiff-athletes further contended 
that the NCAA, as well as the Big Ten Conference and Purdue Uni-
versity, had knowledge of the “repetitive sub-concussive and con-
cussive impacts to football players” and that they “created a serious 
risk of neurodegenerative disorders and disease.”219 Thus, as the for-
mer football players stated, the NCAA was in a superior position 
compared to the student-athletes in having comprehensive 
knowledge and understanding of the risk of serious neurodegenera-
tive disorders as a result of playing college football.220 
In the Rose case, Rose and his fellow plaintiff Stratton had both 
suffered several sub-concussive hits and concussive hits, and at the 
time of trial, they had both suffered neurodegenerative brain  
diseases.221 Both young men suffered from a variety of symptoms, 
including memory loss, depression, abrupt and uncontrollable mood 
swings, migraines, and anxiety.222 In a contradictory statement, the 
court in Rose stated that although the athletes clearly expected the 
NCAA to protect their health and safety, they did not clearly expect 
to be compensated for those injuries which were not necessarily 
foreseeable, and thus Rose was not entitled to compensation.223 It is 
apparent that courts have to yet to give full weight to the fact that 
athletes are not nearly as well-equipped to understand the inherent 
risks of athletic participation as are the NCAA or universities,  
despite the crushing impact that this lack of understanding has on 
the future health and safety of athletes.224 
G. Validity of Waivers 
In order for a waiver to be valid, it must be clear to the one waiv-
ing their right to sue what exactly is being waived, including 
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“properly identifying the parties, consideration, capacity, and  
understanding of the intent of the parties through use of clear,  
unambiguous language.”225 In analyzing the validity of any waivers 
that student-athletes consent to with regard to the liability of the 
NCAA, courts should refer back to the aforementioned Tunkl factors 
in order to determine whether such waivers are fair, legal, and  
adhere to public policy.226 
The Tunkl factors that are relevant in determining the validity of 
waivers between student-athletes and the NCAA, as well as  
universities, are the fourth, fifth, and sixth factors.227 The fourth fac-
tor considers the difference in bargaining power between the parties 
agreeing to the waiver.228 In the case of the NCAA, it is clear that 
the athletic organization has the upper-hand in the relationship. The 
fifth and sixth factors analyze whether or not the waiver would fall 
under the level of a contract of adhesion because of the nature of the 
relationship between the parties.229 Again, it is arguable that because 
of the aforementioned imbalance in power between these parties in 
the present types of agreements, such waivers could easily be 
viewed by a court as that of adhesion.230 After a proper analysis  
using the Tunkl factors, the court should then look more closely at 
the assumption-of-risk doctrine’s two requirements: (1) that the stu-
dent-athlete understands the inherent risk of athletic activity; and (2) 
that the athlete voluntarily assumes the risk of injury.231 
 
225 See Pauline et al., supra note 203, at 109. 
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1. Understanding the Degree of Risk 
It is clear that many athletes “do not fully understand the cost of 
temporary success over their physical and mental well-being.”232 
Yet, the NCAA relies heavily on the argument that an athlete  
“voluntarily assumes the risk of any injury inherent in his or her 
sport.”233 The assumption-of-risk doctrine first requires that there be 
proof that the participant is aware of the inherent risks involved in 
the activity, and that they understand that degree of risk associated 
with the activity.234 However, it is unclear whether student-athletes 
actually understand, or have the ability or opportunity to understand, 
the totality of the “inherent” risks of participating in college sports. 
There are many risks that student-athletes do not necessarily  
assume, such as use of dangerous or defective equipment, poor  
medical treatment from school staff, negligence on behalf of the 
coaching staff, or intentional aggression or torts committed by  
opposing teams.235  
Some courts have refuted the assumption-of-risk defense in 
cases where it is clear that a plaintiff could not reasonably assume 
the inherent risks in question; such factors that the court may con-
sider include a plaintiff’s age, intelligence, experience, and general 
knowledge.236 When taking such factors into consideration, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that an eighteen-year-old student has a less 
comprehensible understanding of all of the supposedly inherent 
risks that are incorporated in college athletics than the NCAA does, 
where the organization’s main objective is to represent and protect 
student-athletes.237 The NCAA sees things differently in most liti-
gation involving liability for injuries endured by student-athletes, 
many times blaming schools, coaches, and the student-athletes 
themselves.238 However, the NCAA, it can be reasonably assumed, 
 
232 Mason, supra note 22, at 516. 
233 Id. at 521 (emphasis added). 
234 See Denner, supra note 12, at 210. 
235 See Kessler, supra note 128, at 81. 
236 See Denner, supra note 12, at 211. 
237 See supra Part II.B. 
238 See Bradley v. NCAA, 249 F. Supp. 3d 149, 171 (D.D.C. 2017); see also Greiber v. 
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 2017 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5234, at *11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 
5, 2017). 
2020] SHOULD THE NCAA HAVE TO PAY? 1421 
 
is better situated with respect to knowledge of inherent risks and 
further, should be responsible for disclosing these risks to future and 
current athletes.239 
2. The “Voluntary” Participation Façade 
As previously stated, in order for the assumption-of-risk doc-
trine to apply, there must be proof that the plaintiff-participant  
voluntarily participated in the activity, despite their being well 
aware of the potential and inherent risks.240 Thus, one of the biggest 
arguments used to shut down litigation from student-athletes against 
the NCAA is that athletes voluntarily participate in collegiate ath-
letics, and therefore voluntarily undertake the inherent risks of said 
participation.241 However, it is highly questionable as to whether (1) 
student-athletes actually do “voluntarily” participate in athletics, 
and even if they do, (2) whether the inherent risks they consent to 
include the potentially lifelong injuries or physical problems that 
student-athletes often endure.242 In Bukowski v. Clarkson Univer-
sity, Bukowski, a baseball pitcher, was injured during a “live  
practice” when the freshmen athlete was hit by a batted ball.243  
Bukowski argued that the university and coach were liable because 
he was instructed by coaches to hold the live practice without using 
a protective screen to pitch, which would have protected him from 
his injury.244 Bukowski argued that he had “no option but to partic-
ipate without a protective screen” because it was customary of team 
practices and what the coach instructed.245 The court, however,  
rejected this argument; they decided that such participation was vol-
untary, and that such injury was an inherent risk to such voluntary 
participation.246 While it is acceptable to assume that a baseball 
player does voluntarily accept the risk of getting hit by a baseball in 
practice, that assumption is made based on typical baseball practices 
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and customs.247 The “customary” team practice of pitching without 
a screen during hitting practice is not necessarily the typical practice 
of baseball teams in college, however, and it is clear that the athlete 
in this case felt pressured to participate in the practice to appease the 
coach and his team.248 
Although the courts have determined that student-athletes are 
not employees and that they generally lack a contractual relationship 
with the NCAA, as mentioned above, it is apparent that student-ath-
letes have a special relationship with the NCAA, in which they  
depend on the NCAA to protect them in exchange for their services 
as athletes in Division I programs.249 Student-athletes further de-
pend on coaches, university staff, and the NCAA to ensure a con-
trolled environment that facilitates learning and safe athletic com-
petition.250 This reliance clearly shatters the façade that athletes do 
not volunteer to the physical toll that short-term play has on their 
lives in the long-run. 
III. SOLUTION: DOING AWAY WITH ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND 
PROVIDING OTHER MEANS OF PROTECTING STUDENT-ATHLETES 
Student-athletes cannot reasonably assume the risk of injury 
upon their participation in their respective sports when they sign 
agreements with universities and the NCAA to become members of 
varsity teams. Factors such as the imbalance in negotiating power 
between students and the NCAA, the superior knowledge of the 
NCAA about inherent risks, and the deep pockets of the NCAA all 
point to the conclusion that the NCAA should be held liable for  
injuries sustained by student-athletes, and that there should be a 
more efficient structure implemented to protect and help student-
athletes beyond just the short-term impact of their injuries. 
 
247 From the author’s experience playing Division I Softball, the customary practice is 
for pitchers and/or coaches to stand behind a net during batting practice as a means of 
protection. 
248 See Bukowski, 86 A.D.3d at 740. 
249 See generally id.; see also Davidson v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 142 N.C. App. 
544, 555–56 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). 
250 See NCAA Division I Manual (2018–19), supra note 20, at 3. 
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A. Bargaining Power of Student-Athletes 
One of the most concerning aspects of the relationship between 
the NCAA and student-athletes is the lack of bargaining power on 
the side of student-athletes. In professional sports, such as the NFL 
or the NBA, a team or organization’s legal duty exists as a matter of 
a contractual obligation.251 This is because professional athletes are 
typically members of unions, from which they benefit from CBAs, 
as previously mentioned.252 Such agreements take into consideration 
laws surrounding contract, tort, and labor laws to ensure protection 
and coverage of athletes who endure serious injuries while compet-
ing in professional sports.253 
Despite the clear desire to protect professional athletes via 
CBAs, employment contracts, and unions which puts professionals 
in a much better situation in terms of compensation for long-term 
injury, there seems to be less urgency in the athletic community to 
similarly protect student-athletes. The biggest argument that the 
NCAA and some courts have expressed is that there is no actual 
“contract” between student-athletes and the NCAA nor their  
respective universities.254 The NCAA still stands by the belief that 
there is not an enforceable contract between the parties despite  
various factors pointing to the contrary, namely the fact that  
student-athletes must sign a Letter of Intent; the fact that student-
athletes must agree to comply with the rules and regulations of the 
NCAA bylaws; the fact that the NCAA has enforcement protocols 
against athletes and schools who break these aforementioned rules; 
and the fact that the NCAA makes a significant profit from colle-
giate sports.255 Furthermore, there is a lack of consistency amongst 
circuits regarding the classification of the type of relationship that is 
shared by student-athletes and athletic organizations. 
Moreover, student-athletes have a lesser bargaining power  
because of the unbalanced distribution of dependence in the 
 
251 See Denner, supra note 12, at 229. 
252 See id. at 230; see also supra note 160 and accompanying text.   
253 See id. at 230. 
254 See id. at 229. 
255 See, e.g., NLI Binding Agreement Facts, supra note 183; NCAA Division I Manual 
(2018–19), supra note 20, at 335; supra text accompanying note 126. 
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relationship between athletes and universities or the NCAA. As pre-
viously mentioned, some courts have determined that student-ath-
letes and universities or the NCAA hold a mutually dependent rela-
tionship.256 However, it is clear that the dependence is not equal: 
student-athletes are far more dependent on the NCAA and universi-
ties while playing in college athletics as they are required to adhere 
to NCAA’s guidelines in order to maintain eligibility in their respec-
tive sport.257 For example, student-athletes are required to attend 
seminars and informational sessions outlining the ethical and regu-
latory standards of participating in Division I athletics at an NCAA 
member institution.258 Such unethical behaviors are listed in the  
Bylaws as well, explaining that student-athletes may not receive 
special treatment for their status as athletes.259 Student-athletes 
agree to follow these guidelines, and in exchange rely on the prom-
ises of the NCAA to further their education, protect their well-being, 
and reasonably prevent them from hardships or injuries.260 Athletes 
are forced to comply with the NCAA Bylaws in order to participate 
in collegiate athletics, therefore the NCAA holds great power over 
student-athletes and controls their ability to participate in college 
sports at all.261 
B. Assumption of Risk vs. Reliance and Property Interest 
Within the context of college sports, the first question regarding 
the use of the assumption-of-risk doctrine is whether a participant in 
collegiate sports truly “volunteers” to take on the inherent risks  
of the sport.262 Students assume that compliance with NCAA regu-
lations and bylaws will guarantee or at least assist in the venture of 
admission into a school of higher education. In many cases, such 
prospects are made with the promise of scholarship to pay for 
 
256 See supra Part II.B. 
257 NCAA Division I Manual (2018–19), supra note 20, at 7. 
258 Author’s note: as a former Division I athlete, there were informational sessions that 
my fellow student-athletes and I were required to attend in order to compete in games. 
These sessions often outlined good ethical practices and NCAA regulations of student-
athletes. See also NCAA Division I Manual (2018–19), supra note 20, at 45. 
259 NCAA Division I Manual (2018–19), supra note 20, at 61–91. 
260 See id. at xii (promising a commitment to the student-athletes’ well-being). 
261 See Mason, supra note 22, at 521–22. 
262 See id. at 522–23. 
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school. With such valuable interests on the line, are student-athletes 
able to “voluntarily” consent to the risks associated with ath- 
letic participation? 
1. Scholarships 
Student-athletes cannot be reasonably believed to voluntarily  
assume the risks of athletic participation, when they rely on their 
membership on a team for financial means to pay for school.  
Athletic scholarships are granted to student-athletes on an annual 
basis; athletes who receive scholarships based on athletic ability are 
not guaranteed to receive their grant all four years of school (five 
years for some athletes in unique circumstances).263 Student-athletes 
are awarded scholarships in exchange for their commitment to  
perform in athletics for their school, and comply with all rules and 
regulations set forth by the NCAA.264 If scholarship-athletes do not 
follow the rules and regulations of the NCAA, they run the risk of 
losing their scholarships, which would result in a loss of any ability 
to pay for an education at all for many students.265 
While universities do typically use their discretion to honor 
scholarships for athletes who are ruled out due to physical injuries, 
students still feel the pressure to continue through injury or pain, out 
of fear of losing these valuable scholarships.266 This fear stems from 
a misunderstanding of their rights as student-athletes and insecurity 
in the belief that the NCAA will follow through to “protect their 
well-being.”267 In reflecting on the relevant cases, it is clear that 
there is a dominant-submissive power dynamic between athletes and 
their coaches, universities, and the NCAA.268 
2. Admission or Academic Support 
While there have been arguments that scholarship-athletes 
should be compensated, some non-scholarship student-athletes also 
 
263 See NCAA Division I Manual (2018–19), supra note 20, 206–11. 
264 See Mason, supra note 22, at 522. 
265 See id. at 522. 
266 See Kessler, supra note 128, at 97–98. 
267 Mission Statements and Bylaws, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/
M_WinonaState_SAACBylaws.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2QM-HYNC]. 
268 See Kessler, supra note 128, at 97–98. 
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rely on athletics as a means to gain acceptance into a school. Those 
athletes should still be covered with medical coverage for long-term 
injuries. A common misunderstanding of the system of athletic 
scholarships is that athletes simply receive a free ride with no strings 
attached.269 This is far from the truth. As previously mentioned, the 
NCAA mandates that athletic scholarships are only allowed to be 
given on an annual basis.270 Thus, student-athletes cannot just  
assume that no matter how they perform, athletically or academi-
cally, that they will continue to have the financial support they are 
supposedly “guaranteed” from the beginning of their college athletic 
career.271 Further, the NCAA bylaws state that it is at the discretion 
of member institutions to decide whether or not they will honor 
scholarships for students who are unable to participate in athletics 
due to physical injury or poor academic performance, thus in- 
creasing the fear in student-athletes of potentially losing their  
financial aid.272 
3. Educational Goals and Ignoring Brain Trauma 
Student-athletes rely on universities and athletic institutions like 
the NCAA to protect their education and well-being beyond their 
physical health.273 Speaking from personal experience as a former 
Division I athlete, the author of this Note has seen firsthand how 
many student-athletes find the balance between commitment to their 
teams and a regular school workload to be grueling and how when 
they become athletes at universities, there is an understanding that 
their coaches, schools, and other athletic representatives will assist 
them in furthering their education. Ultimately, obtaining higher  
education is the main purpose of attending a university for the vast 
majority of student-athletes in the United States. 
From an “extra-legal” lens, it is important to focus on the  
objective of both universities and the NCAA when it comes to the 
well-being of student-athletes. The NCAA and member institutions 
 
269 NCAA Division I Manual (2018–19), supra note 20, 206–11 (explaining requirements 
to receive and maintain athletic scholarships). 
270 Id. at 201. 
271 Id. at 206. 
272 See id. at 208 
273 See id. at xii. 
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have very specific and unique objectives when it comes to their  
relationship with student-athletes, all of which are ignored through 
their inaction when it comes to the protection and compensation of 
student-athletes.274 The aim of member institutions is to provide a 
higher level of education for students, through an “education of the 
highest quality.”275 Further, the mission of the NCAA is to “empha-
size academic opportunities and responsibilities of student-athletes 
in their college experiences.”276 Tellingly, neither of these objec-
tives includes caring for student-athletes’ long term health. 
C. Compensation for Long-Term Medical Issues 
Many scholars and advocates for student-athletes have argued 
that the NCAA should implement some kind of worker’s compen-
sation benefit for student-athletes who endure injuries while partic-
ipating in collegiate sports.277 This seems like a much-needed solu-
tion considering that, without student-athletes, the NCAA would not 
exist and would not be profitable. In fiscal year 2016–2017, the 
NCAA had a total revenue of $1.06 billion.278 The organization 
made $761 million dollars alone for the 2017 NCAA men’s basket-
ball tournament.279 How is this money spent? According to a 2017 
study, of the $1.06 billion revenue for the NCAA, about $560 mil-
lion, approximately 60% of the annual revenue, gets distributed 
amongst Division I schools.280 But what happened to the remaining 
$446 million made in 2017? Remembering that the NCAA was cre-
ated as an organization to protect student-athletes from serious 
 
274 Id. 
275 See, e.g., Mission Statement, FORDHAM U., https://www.fordham.edu/info/20057/
about/2997/mission_statement [https://perma.cc/CLF7-TNVD]; Mission Statement, 
LAFAYETTE C., http://catalog.lafayette.edu/en/current/Catalog/Introduction/Mission-
Statement [https://perma.cc/CLF7-TNVD]. 
276 Mission Statements and Bylaws, supra note 264. 
277 See Denner, supra note 12, at 229–30. 
278 See Darren Rovell, NCAA Tops $1 Billion in Revenue During 2016–17 School Year, 
ESPN (Mar. 7, 2018) https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/22678988/ncaa-
tops-1-billion-revenue-first [https://perma.cc/7ZWU-JL3S]. 
279 See id. 
280 See Alex Kirshner, Don’t Miss the Point About All the Money the NCAA Tournament 
Makes, SB NATION (Mar. 7, 2018, 3:19 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/college-basket
ball/2018/3/7/17093112/ncaa-tournament-revenue-tv-athletes-2018 [https://perma.cc/
KWT6-7A3D]. 
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injuries, it is not irrational to suggest that the remaining nearly half 
a billion dollars be put towards creating long-term medical insur-
ance programs for student-athletes. However, this is not the current 
use of that remaining funds. The NCAA’s website lists that a portion 
of their funds, $74.3 million and $39.7 million, are used for “other  
association-wide expenses” and “general and administrative  
expenses” respectively.281 The meaning and details of such expenses 
are not available to the public, so it is unclear what expenses are 
covered by “other association wide-expenses.”282 It is not unfa-
thomable to think that the organization could use such excess funds 
to facilitate insurance-like programs for student-athletes, in terms of 
long-term care, which would circle back to the NCAA’s original and 
true purpose: protecting student-athletes from injury.283 
The NCAA has taken some steps to create adequate coverage for 
student-athletes with insurance; however, the coverage is very lim-
ited. The NCAA has implemented what is called the “Catastrophic 
Insurance Program.”284 The Catastrophic Insurance Program covers 
student-athletes that have suffered extreme physical injury or illness 
that has precluded them from playing sports, covering up to $90,000 
in medical bills for the athlete, only after their own insurance plans 
have met their limit.285 Section 3.2.4.8.1. of the Bylaws states that a 
student-athletes’ coverage must cover “equal or greater the value 
than the deductible of the NCAA Catastrophic Injury Program,” 
which should be provided through the insurance of a participant’s 
guardians, personal coverage, or the insurance provided by the uni-
versity itself.286 The NCAA created this program in 2005, and has 
since made an effort to ensure that student-athletes have insurance 
 
281 See Where Does the Money Go?, supra note 147. 
282 See id. 
283 See Smith, supra note 14, at 269–70. 
284 NCAA Division I Manual (2018–19), supra note 20, at 10, 12. 
285 Cory McCune, NCAA Policies for Student-Athlete Medical Insurance Breakdown, 
BLEACHER REP. (Apr. 8, 2013), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1595326-ncaa-policies-
for-student-athlete-medical-insurance-breakdown [https://perma.cc/L86L-5KP8]. 
286 NCAA Division I Manual (2018–19), supra note 20, at 10. 
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and medical coverage for injuries sustained while participating in 
athletic activities.287 
While, initially, this may seem to be adequate coverage, in prac-
tice, this only covers athletes for the immediate impact of their inju-
ries. The coverage under the Catastrophic Coverage Insurance  
Program requires that (1) student-athletes have insurance by their 
own means, and (2) that the insurance has a deductible of $90,000. 
The Program then states that once the deductible has been met, the 
NCAA will then provide limited coverage.288 For those who are  
eligible, this coverage can span over a lifetime, not simply the two 
years promised in other injury coverage by the school; the coverage 
will actually extend, after the $90,000 threshold, for a maximum of 
$20 million in coverage.289 However, this program only covers those 
who suffer severe, nearly life-ending injuries, which have left them 
disabled or handicapped for life.290 This coverage does not account 
for the thousands of student-athletes who have a lifetime of  
migraines, memory loss, joint pain and injuries, and other lifelong 
symptoms that are not necessarily “life-threatening,” but are still de-
bilitating and painful. 
Further, the NCAA has made an attempt to expand their medical 
coverage with an “exceptional student-athlete disability insurance 
program” which provides limited qualifying students with disability 
insurance contracts.291 These contracts use pre-approved financing 
to “protect against future loss of earnings as a professional athlete 
due to a disabling injury or sickness that may occur during the 
 
287 NCAA Student-Athlete Medical Insurance Legislation, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/
about/resources/insurance/ncaa-student-athlete-medical-insurance-legislation 
[https://perma.cc/B88B-XZL3]. 
288 See Student-Athletes Unaware of Their Career-Ending Injuries, supra note 44. 
289 See id. 
290 See id. 
291 See Exceptional Student-Athlete Disability Insurance Program, NCAA, 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/insurance/exceptional-student-athlete-disability-
insurance-program (non-archivable website). (Note that this “exceptional student-athletes 
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hockey, and women’s basketball. This classification is based on athletes’ ability to be 
drafted into professional sports leagues; thus only student athletes who can potentially “go 
pro” qualify for the insurance program.)  
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college career.”292 However, this program is simply a loan program, 
and athletes essentially borrow money through the NCAA, which 
will later need to be paid back to the organization.293 Thus, instead 
of putting a portion of the $74.3 million “other expenses” to assist 
former student-athletes with lifelong health issues, the NCAA 
merely offers them a loan program.294 
The media and the NCAA have regularly ignored lesser- 
named athletes who constantly sacrifice their physical health and 
well-being for their sport, their schools, and the NCAA’s fiscal well- 
being.295 Beyond that, the NCAA leaves it up to the discretion of 
each NCAA member institution to decide how much coverage stu-
dent-athletes are protected with, if any at all.296 The $90,000 amount 
is a one-time threshold, not annually reimbursed for the years fol-
lowing the end of one’s athletic career; the issue arises when former 
athletes are left to foot the bill for their medical expenses for years 
following their initial injury.297 
As previously mentioned, some scholars and students’ rights ac-
tivists have suggested that student-athletes should be given worker’s 
compensation when they become members of athletic teams. Such 
measures would compensate athletes when they become unable to 
play their sport due to injury.298 However, this argument is often 
shot down because many courts have concluded that student-athletes 
are not employees of their schools or the NCAA, and workers com-
pensation is only available for employees.299 In one case, the Su-
preme Court of Colorado rejected the idea of worker’s compensa-
tion for a football player.300 The court held that “none of the benefits 
he received could . . . be claimed as consideration to play football, 
and there is nothing in the evidence that is indicative of the fact that 
the contract of hire by the college was dependent upon his playing 
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football . . . .”301 This case is over fifty years old, but the sentiment 
has not changed to date.302  
Just as was seen in the Dawson case, courts continue to hold that 
although the NCAA benefits financially from student-athlete partic-
ipation, poses limitations on the distribution of athletic scholarships, 
and enforces mandatory regulations on athletes at member institu-
tions, there is somehow still not a contractual relationship of mutual 
dependence between the NCAA and student-athletes.303 This is  
because the courts seem to continue to incorrectly apply the assump-
tion-of-risk doctrine, and have curiously disregarded the borderline 
contract of adhesion to which the NCAA forces student-athletes to 
accede. Agreeing to the rules and regulations outlined by the NCAA, 
student-athletes are required to sign an agreement which should be  
mutually binding as a contract in courts of law.304  
The NCAA Bylaws lay out clear promises to protect student-
athletes, to work with member institutions in an effective way, and 
to create a safe environment for the athletes.305 However, as is clear 
in all of the preceding cases, when student-athletes request that the 
NCAA follow through on these promises, the NCAA either redirects 
their liability to member institutions, or claims that there was never  
actually an enforceable agreement to begin with.306 This is obvi-
ously confusing for athletes who are told that in order to stay eligible 
in college athletics, they must adhere to the NCAA Bylaws, but are 
then told that the NCAA does not have the same obligation, as the 
courts have repeatedly decided.307 
Further, the repeated use of the assumption-of-risk doctrine by 
the NCAA as a defense should no longer be accepted by the courts, 
as it is clear that the nature of participation in athletics is not always 
 
301 State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Indus. Comm’n of Colo., 314 P.2d 288, 288–90 (Colo. 
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entirely voluntary.308 Courts have repeatedly misinterpreted the  
relationship between the NCAA and student-athletes, by failing to 
recognize the coercive nature of the relationship. Finally, student-
athletes do not receive full disclosure from the NCAA, especially 
with respect to information that would adequately inform student-
athletes of the extent of inherent risks to which they are allegedly 
agreeing.309 Time and time again, in a variety of cases, student-ath-
letes have explained to the courts that they were not warned of the 
non-inherent risks of their athletic participation.310 Due to the nature 
of the special relationship between student-athletes and the NCAA, 
the NCAA should be held liable for lifelong medical expenses of 
student-athletes for the injuries sustained while acting as represent-
atives of their school and the national organization. 
CONCLUSION 
With fewer than 2% of the 179,200 student-athletes in Division 
I programs getting through the first step towards a professional ath-
letic career, it is clear that student-athletes depend on the NCAA to 
protect them as they provide benefits by serving their teams, their 
schools, and the NCAA itself during their time as athletes.311 It is 
evident that the NCAA has a special relationship with student-ath-
letes, and therefore should be held to a higher standard of liability 
than what is currently enforced in the courts. The two have  
a mutually dependent relationship, in which the NCAA relies on the 
participation and performance of student-athletes in order to remain 
economically lucrative as an organization, and athletes rely on the 
NCAA to enforce rules and regulations that are meant to protect the 
mental and physical well-being of student-athletes.312 
When the NCAA fails to uphold their obligation, despite active 
participation in athletics by students, the organization should be held 
liable, and student-athletes should be properly compensated for their 
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crippling long-term injuries. If a student-athlete abides by the rules 
and regulations of the NCAA Bylaws, they should reasonably  
expect that the NCAA will follow through with their promise to 
“conduct [intercollegiate athletics] in a manner designed to enhance 
the well-being of student-athletes who choose to participate and to 
prevent undue commercial or other influences that may interfere 
with their scholastic, athletics or related interests.”313 
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